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Articles

The National Bankruptcy Review
Commission's Section 365
Recommendations and the "Larger
Conceptual Issues"*
David G. Epstein**
Steve H. Nickles***
I.

Introduction

In the chapter of the Report of the National Bankruptcy
Commission ("Report") entitled "Business Bankruptcy," 1 the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission ("Review Commission")

* This paper was presented at the Dickinson Law Review Symposium on Feburary
5, 1998, and was submitted to the editors of the Dickinson Law Review for publication on
Feburary 26, 1998. This paper "speaks" as of Feburary 26, 1998, and does not reflect the
activity of courts, Congress or law review writers since that date.
** Charles E. Tweedy Chair in Law, University of Alabama Law School. Professor
Epstein campaigned shamelessly and unsuccessfully for appointment to the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission.
*** C. C. Hope Chair of Financial Services and Law, Wake Forest University. Professor
Nickles campaigned shamelessly and unsuccessfully for Professor Epstein's appointment to
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission.
1. Section 365 applies in consumer bankruptcy cases as well as business bankruptcy
cases. The Review Commission does not expressly indicate that these recommendations are
limited to business cases.
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makes four recommendations regarding section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code:
2.4.1 Clarifying the Meaning of "Rejection"
The concept of "rejection" in section 365 should be replaced
with "election to breach."
Section 365 should provide that a trustee's ability to elect to
breach a contract of the debtor is not an avoiding power.
Section 502(g) should be amended to provide that a claim
arising from the election to breach shall be allowed or disallowed the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of
the filing of the petition.
2.4.2 Clarifying the Option of "Assumption"
"Assumption" should be replaced with "election to perform" in
section 365.
2.4.3 Interim Protection and Obligations of Nondebtor Parties
A court should be authorized to grant an order governing
temporary performance and/or providing protection of the
interests of the nondebtor party until the court approves a
decision to perform or breach a contract.
Section 503(b) should include as an administrative expense
losses reasonably and unavoidably sustained by a nondebtor
party to a contract, a standard based on nonbankruptcy contract
principles, pending court approval of an election to perform or
breach a contract if such nondebtor party was acting in
accordance with a court order governing temporary performance.
2.4.4 Contracts Subject to Section 365; Eliminating the "Executory" Requirement
Title 11 should be amended to delete all references to "executory" in section 365 and related provisions, and "executoriness"
should be eliminated as a prerequisite to the trustee's election
to assume or breach a contract.

These recommendations and the Report's discussion of the four
recommendations address some, but not all, of the larger conceptu-
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al issues relating to the bankruptcy treatment of leases and
executory contracts.
II.

History of Bankruptcy Treatment of Leases and Executory
Contracts

A. Congressional Enactments

Congress first dealt with leases and executory contracts sixty
years ago. In 1938, the Chandler Act2 added sections 63c, 70b,
116(1), 216(4), 313, 353, 355(2), and 357(2) to the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898.3
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and subsequent
amendments thereto [the "Bankruptcy Code"],4 Congress replaced
these provisions with sections 365, 502(a)(6), 502(g), 366, 559, 560,
1110, 1113, 1114, 1123(b)(2), 1222(b)(6), and 1322(b)(7). 5 In so
legislating, Congress retained the basic concept from the Chandler
Act that in a bankruptcy case a debtor can reject or assume or
assign its leases and executory contracts.
B.

Case Law

The concept of a debtor election to assume or reject leases and
executory contracts is not a statutory innovation. More than thirty
years before the Chandler Act, the Eighth Circuit stated in Watson
v. Merrill, 6 "[t]he effect (of bankruptcy) is to transfer to the trustee
all of the property of the debtor except his executory contracts and
to vest in the trustee the option to assume or renounce these. " 7
Professor Countryman traces the case law doctrine of assumption or rejection of leases and executory contracts to the judicial
doctrine of abandonment. 8 Michael Andrew, on the other hand,
attributes the doctrine of abandonment to case law on assumption
or rejection of leases, an 1818 English case, Copeland v. Stevens, 9

2. The Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (amending
Bankruptcy Act of 1898) (repealed 1978).
3. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1944) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
5. See generally Don Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the
Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1980).
6. 136 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1905).
7. Id. at 363.
8. See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV.
439, 440-47 (1973) [hereinafter Countryman I).
9. 106 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1818).
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holding that a lease does not become a part of a general bankruptcy assignment unless the assignee accepts (assumes?) the lease. 10
Regardless of which came first-abandonment or assumption and
rejection of leases-the "chicken" or the "egg'', there was a
considerable body of case law prior to 1938 recognizing an
assumption or rejection election in bankruptcy with respect to
leases and executory contracts.

C. Law Review Commentary
Through the years, law review articles have had a uncommonly
strong impact on the development of the bankruptcy treatment of
leases and executory contracts. In 1927, Professor MacLachlan
recommended that the case law on assumption or rejection of
leases and executory contracts be codified. 11 These recommendations shaped the Chandler Act's provisions on leases and executory
contracts. Then, in 1973, Professor Countryman published two
articles on executory contracts in the Minnesota Law Review. 12
These articles, a product of Professor Countryman's work for the
earlier Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 13
influenced the work of that Commission on leases and executory
contracts. And, Professor Countryman's articles have influenced
the work of the courts in determining whether a transaction is an
"executory contract." 14

10. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection", 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 846, 856-59 (1988) [hereinafter Andrew I].
11. See James MacLachlan, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583,
605 (1927).
12. See Countryman I; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II,
58 MINN. L. REV. 479 (1974) [hereinafter Countryman II].
13. Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in
1970 to study and recommend changes in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Act of July 24, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 9-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). This Commission submitted its final report to
Congress in 1973 in two parts: the first part reported general findings and recommendations,
and the second part was a draft of a bill to implement the recommendations. Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, pts I & II, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137
(1973). These recommendations, with substantial changes, became the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. See generally Eric Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 240 (1997); see also Harry D. Dixon, Jr., Bankruptcy Commissions: Then and Now, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 3 (1996).
14. See generally 3 JUDGE JAMES F QUEENAN, JR. ET AL., CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND
PRACTICE, § 17.04 (1994). At a 1988 American Law Institute/American Bar Association
conference on bankruptcy, Professor Countryman described his Minnesota Law Review
article's definition of "executory contract":
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III. Recent Theoretical Evolution
Law review articles have not only influenced what the
bankruptcy law of leases and executory contracts now is but also
have influenced the debate about what the law should be. Law
review articles by. Michael Andrew provided much of the impetus
for review (and for new views) of the bankruptcy law of leases and
executory contracts. 15
At the time of the publication of the first Andrew law review
article, 16 the National Bankruptcy Conference17 was beginning its
review of the Bankruptcy Code. The Andrew article influenced the
National Bankruptcy Conference's work on section 365. A
Working Group of the National Bankruptcy has drafted a comprehensive revision of section 365;18 that draft is reproduced at the
. end of the article.
Articles by Jay Westbrook 19 and others also had a major
impact on the work of the National Bankruptcy Conference. More
important, Professor Westbrook's writings form the primary basis
not only for the Review Commission's four recommendations

"All it purported to do was extract from the cases we'd had so far what the courts
had viewed as executory contracts. The only thing that I supplied was an
explanation, which none of the cases gave, for why there was a requirement that
performance be due from both sides. The cases were pretty clear that a
performance was due from both sides or it wasn't an executory contract. I really
don't see yet why that definition should be changed."
ALI-ABA, Williamsburg Conference on Bankruptcy-Transcript 85 (1989) (hereinafter
Williamsburg Conference].
15. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection'', 59 U. COLO. L REV. 845 (1988) [hereinafter Andrew I]; Michael T. Andrew, Executory
Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(hereinafter Andrew II].
16. See Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at 53.
17. The National Bankruptcy Conference is a non-profit voluntary association of about
65 judges, professors, and practicing attorneys from all parts of the United States. The
Conference was founded in the middle 1930s to promote the improvement of the bankruptcy
laws and their administration. The Conference, which meets twice a year, has been
consistently active in the legislative process.
18. The senior author of this article served as Reporter to the National Bankruptcy
Conference Working Group on Leases and Executory Contracts.
19. See, e.g., Jay Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 227 (1989) (hereinafter Westbrook I]; Jay Westbrook, A Fresh Start for Bankruptcy
Contracts, in 64TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BANKRUPTCY
JUDGES, 2-31 (1990) [hereinafter Westbrook II]. According to Andrew, his conclusions and
Professor Westbrook's "ultimate conclusions are all but identical." Andrew II, supra note
16, at 2. But cf Westbrook II, supra, at 2-32, 2-33.
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regarding leases and executory contracts but also the Review
Commission's twenty-one pages of discussion of this area. 20
IV. Five "Larger Conceptual Issues"
The Review Commission's discussion of leases and executory
contracts begins with the statement that "instead of undertaking a
piecemeal analysis of each subsection of section 365, the Commission reviewed the larger conceptual issues inherent in section 365
to eliminate confusion on a global basis. " 21 We question (i)
whether the Review Commission reviewed the "larger conceptual
issues" inherent in section 365 and -(ii) we question whether such
a review is necessary.
We understand that the Report may not completely address all
of the Review Commission's work on these "larger conceptual
issues."
More important, we believe that Congress should
understand that the Review Commission's recommendations and
discussion do not completely address the following five "larger
conceptual issues" relating to the bankruptcy treatment of leases
and executory contracts:
(1) What can happen to a section 365 transaction in
bankruptcy?;
(2) Which transactions should be treated as section 365
transactions?;
(3) Who decides what happens to a section 365 transaction in bankruptcy?;
(4) What are the obligations and rights of a nondebtor
party to a section 365 transaction during the course of the
case?; and
(5) Which section 365 transactions should be treated
different from other section 365 transactions?

A. What Can Happen to a Section 365 Transaction in Bankruptcy?

1. Overview of Present Code Provision.-Section 365 provides
for the rejection, assumption, or assignment of leases and executory
contracts. Understanding rejection, assumption and assignment is
the first step to understanding what can happen to a lease or
executory contract in bankruptcy.

20. See BNA BANKRUPTCY LAW DAILY, March 13, 1997, at xx. 19.
21. Report of the National Bankruptcy Commission, at 459 [hereinafter Report].
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Consider, for example, debtor, D, who at the time of its bankruptcy
is a tenant at Blackacre Mall under a ten-year lease. The 1997
lease has a ten year term ~nd provides for rent of $10,000 a month.
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, D missed three monthly rent
payments to its landlord BM.
In bankruptcy, D can reject the lease. On rejection, D is
obligated to surrender the leasehold, and BM has a limited,
unsecured claim. 22 Even though the rejection occurs postpetition,
BM's claim is treated as a prepetition claim since BM's rights under
the lease arose prepetition. 23
Alternatively, D can assume the lease. On assumption, D
retains the leasehold, and BM has an unlimited administrative
priority claim for all past, present, and future obligations under the
lease. 24
D's other alternative under section 365 is to assign the lease.
Assignment of a lease or executory contract under bankruptcy law
is different from the general law of assignment. Under contract
law, if X contracts with Y and X later assigns her rights and
delegates her contract duties to Z, the assignor X remains legally
responsible for the performance of the contract. 25 Under bankruptcy law, if Chapter 11 tenant D assigns her lease to X, D has no
further responsibility for future lease obligations. 26

2. Closer View of Review Commission's Recommendations.-The Review Commission retains but "clarifies" rejection,
assumption, and assignment. A part of the clarification is a change
of terms-"rejection" is to become "election to breach," 27 "assumption" is to become "election to perform," and "assignment"
is to become "transfer."

22. See Bankruptcy Code§ 502(b)(6). See generally QUEENAN, JR., ET AL., supra note
15, § 18.24.
23. See Bankruptcy Code § 502(g).
24. See, e.g., In re Norwegian Health Spa, 79 B.R. 507 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987); In re
Mushroom Transportation Co., 78 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); cf Bankruptcy Code
§ 365(b).
25. See E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 830-31 (2d ed. 1990).
26. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(k).
27. See Report, supra note 22, at 460. While "rejection" is a familiar contract law term,
only bankruptcy speaks of rejection of contracts. Outside of bankruptcy, an offeree might
reject an offer; a buyer can reject goods under a contract of sale. Neither an offeree in
common law contract nor a buyer in an Article 2 contract can reject the contract.
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a. Assumption.-The Commission does not otherwise
"clarify" the present law of assumption of leases and executory
contracts. We respectfully suggest that there are important "larger
conceptual issues" relating to assumption than whether to retain
the term "assumption." The present law of assumption results in
a treatment of section 365 transactions that is markedly different
from the bankruptcy treatment for all of the debtor's other
prepetition transactions. Consider, for example, the effect of the
present law of assumption of a lease or an executory contract on a
debtor's prepetition and postconfirmation obligations.
i. Effect of Assumption on Prepetition Obligations.-Chapter
11 debtor D wants to assume its lease at Blackacre Mall, and D
owes BM $30,000 for rent missed prior to its bankruptcy filing. If
D assumes or elects to perform its lease, that $30,000 obligation for
back rent will be treated differently from all of D's other prepetition unsecured obligations. Assumption requires D to pay the
$30,000 unsecured, prepetition back rent claim of landlord BM
regardless of what, if any, distribution is made to other holders of
unsecured claims. 28 Why? What is the larger conceptual basis for
such a rule?
The National Bankruptcy Conference has suggested a
conceptual basis for the rule: parties to leases and executory
contracts, unlike holders of other unsecured claims, have continuing
performance obligations. 29 Assume, for example, that D's lease
with BM provided for higher monthly payments in the early years
of the lease. To permit D to assume or perform the lease without
making these higher, prepetition payments would be to force BM
to continue to provide new value (use of the leasehold) to D on
terms different from the terms that it negotiated.

ii. Effect of Assumption on Postconfirmation Obligations.-And, if Chapter 11 debtor D wants to assume its lease at
Blackacre Mall, the postconfirmation obligations under the lease
will be treated more favorably than any of D's other unsecured or
even secured obligations. Assumption or election to perform
requires D to make the payments provided for in the lease or

28. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(b).
29. REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE
CODE REVIEW PROJECT 137 (rev. ed. 1997).
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contract without change. If D's lease with BM requires monthly
payments of $10,000, then assumption of that lease in bankruptcy
will require D to continue paying the lease rental rate of $10,000
postconfirmation without change. 30
By contrast, Chapter 11 debtor D can cram down changes in
its postconfirmation obligations to holders of other unsecured or
even secured claims. If, for example, Chapter 11 debtor D's other
store is encumbered by a Large Bank (LB) mortgage providing for
ten percent interest and one hundred payments of $10,000 a month,
D can retain that store and, through the provisions of its Chapter
11 plan and the cram down provisions of Chapter 11 (which apply
to holders of secured claims but not landlords holding unsecured
claims), change the interest rate, number of payments, and amount
of each payment. 31
According to the National Bankruptcy Conference report, "it
can be argued that it treats the nondebtor to an executory contract
more favorably than the Bankruptcy Code anywhere treats secured
creditors." 32 With all due (and undue) respect to the National
Bankruptcy Conference reporter on executory contracts who wrote
that statement, the more favorable treatment is a fact not an
argument. What can be argued is that the unsecured, nondebtor
party to a lease or executory contract should not be treated more
favorably than a secured creditor. Professor Klee has made such
an argument:
"It seems unfair to permit the proponent of a plan to rewrite
the covenants in a debt instrument to change the payment
periods and the interest rates for a secured creditor but not to
permit that to be done to a party with a contractual right under
a contract or a true lease. " 33

Why does the bankruptcy law of assumption treat parties to
leases and executory contracts more favorably than bankruptcy law
treats secured creditors? What is the "larger conceptual" basis for
such a rule? The argument that lessor BM is continuing to provide
new value and mortgagor LB is not seems somewhat strained here.
30. See id.
31. See Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)(A). See generally Jack Friedman, What Courts
Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter JI Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495 (1993).
32. REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 30, at 138.
33. Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at 82. It can also be argued that the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in adopting Article 2A
moved toward treating leases more like secured transactions.
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b. Assignment.-The present bankruptcy law of assignment
of a lease or executory contract also raises "larger conceptual
issues" that are not mentioned by the Review Commission. For
example, contractual restrictions on assignments of leases and
contracts that would be enforceable absent bankruptcy are
unenforceable in bankruptcy. 34
Contractual restrictions on transfers of assets of the debtor
other than leases and executory contracts, however, are enforceable
in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy estate's interest in other property
is no greater than the interest of the debtor. 35 While restrictions
on the transfer of a Board of Trade seat will not prevent the seat
from becoming property of the estate, 36 the restrictions will
prevent a Chapter 11 debtor from transferring that seat to a third
party. 37
The "larger concept" that supports the bankruptcy policy of
disregarding restrictions on the assignment of leases and executory
contracts has been variously described in commentary and cases as
a reallocation of values38 and as a balance of the contract right of
a creditor to receive the benefit of its bargain and the equitable
right of the debtor to have a right to reorganize. 39 Neither the
commentary, nor cases, nor the Review Commission directly
explains why these values, but not others, should be reallocated or
why these contract rights but not others should yield to reorganization.40
c. Rejection.-The Review Commission's more extended
discussion of rejection raises but does not resolve these same

34. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(f).
35. Bankruptcy Code§ 541(a)(l) ("interests of the debtor in property").
36. Bankruptcy Code§ 541(c).
37. Section 541(c)(l)(A) applies only to the transfer that occurs when a bankruptcy
petition is filed, and what was property of the debtor becomes property of the estate. We
do not read section 541(c)(l)(A) as affecting a later sale or other transfer of property of
third parties. Accordingly, the property remains subject to transfer restrictions. See also
DOUGLAS BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 97-100 (rev. ed. 1993).
38. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 38.12
115 (1986).
39. Cf In re The Circle K Corporation, 127 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1997).
40. Cf Raymond T. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 546 (1983) ("Section 365(f) arguably
is an overbroad intrusion in contractual rights whose potential effect on contracting activity
is inadequately justified by a desire to capture value for the estate.").
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"larger conceptual issues," but only in the context of rejection. 41
The essence of the Review Commission's clarification of rejection
is that rejection is merely a breach and not an avoiding power.
Since 1938, the bankruptcy laws have stated that rejection of
a lease or executory contract constitutes a breach as of the date of
the bankruptcy petition. And, both the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as
amended and the current Bankruptcy Code provide that a landlord
who rejects its lease in bankruptcy is not able to use that rejection
like an avoiding power and recover its leasehold.
In at least one circuit court decision, a debtor has been
permitted to use section 365 rejection of an executory contract like
an avoiding power. In Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond
Finishers,42 a Chapter 11 owner of a patent used rejection to take
the patent from its prebankruptcy licensee and transfer an exclusive
license to another party at a higher price. Congress subsequently
amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide licensees of intellectual
property with the same protection from section 365 avoidance as
lessees of real property. The Review Commission would make
clear that parties to all of a debtor's leases and executory contracts
have that same protection. The Review Commission correctly
explains "if a debtor were empowered to demand possession of
property from a third party, the bankruptcy process would readjust
the bargains struck at state law, rather than simply determine a
claim for breach. " 43
3. Ride-through-Neither the Review Commission's recommendations nor its discussion of the recommendations mentions
ride-through, but neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 mentions ride-through.
Reorganization cases under the Bankruptcy Act use the term
"ride through" to describe the situation in which the debtor neither
assumes nor rejects the contract or lease. Under the Bankruptcy
Act case law, the consequences of the debtor's failure to assume or
reject are (i) the nondebtor does not have a claim in the case
because there is no breach, (ii) discharge does not affect the

41. See Report, supra note 22, at 459-65.
42. 756 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
43. Report, supra note 22, at 462. The Review Commission does not explain why these
bargains struck at state law should be honored in bankruptcy and other bargains-such as
nonassignability of a lease or executory contract-should not.
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enforceability of the debt, so that (iii) the lease or contract remains
an asset and obligation of the reorganized debtor. 44
There are a few reported cases under the Bankruptcy Code
that attribute the same ride through consequences to leases and
executory contracts that a Chapter 11 debtor neither assumes nor
rejects. 45 We believe these cases are inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's expanded definition of claim. A party to a lease or
executory contract with a Chapter 11 debtor has a section 101(5)
claim even before the lease or contract is assumed or rejected. 46
Any such section 101(5) claim would be extinguished when the
Chapter 11 debtor's plan was confirmed and so would not ride
through the bankruptcy. Consider the following two examples:
(1) X contracts to sell beans to D. X delivers the beans to D.
Before D pays for the beans, D files for Chapter 11 relief. X does
not file a proof of claim; D makes no specific provision for X in its
plan. D's plan is confirmed, and X receives nothing from the
bankruptcy. Under current law, X's rights under its nonexecutory
contract would not ride through D's bankruptcy. Rather, D's
obligation to pay on X's claim would be extinguished by the
discharge. 47
(2) X contracts to sell beans to D. X delivers some but not all
of the beans to D. D files for Chapter 11 relief. D's confirmed
Chapter 11 plan neither assumes nor rejects D's executory contract
with X. Under sections 101(5) and 1141, X's claim is discharged.
Under the ride through caselaw, this executory contract rides
through the bankruptcy, unaffected by the bankruptcy.
While we do not support the caselaw on ride through, we do
support the practice of ride-through, at least in Chapter 11, and
would urge Congress to follow the Review Commission's nonreview of this concept. As the National Bankruptcy Conference
concluded:

44. See, e.g., Federal's Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1977); In re
Afar Dairy, Inc., 458 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1972); see generally Countryman II, supra note 13,
at 561-63.
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 546 n.12 (1984); In re
Continental Country Club, Inc., 114 B.R. 763, 767 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
46. See Bankruptcy Code § 101(5)(A) ("right to payment whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured").
47. See id. § 1141(d)(l)(A) ("discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the
date of such confirmation").
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(T]here are many cases in which there are thousands of
ordinary contracts [i.e., purchase orders, equipment leases, etc.]
which normally "ride-through" without being scheduled and
without notice being given to the other party. In very large
such cases, it would be an administrative headache to schedule
and notify all of them. The debtor and the other party expect
to perform these contracts without formality. In other words,
the debtor's failure to schedule such contracts is not accidental
or inadvertent. The present system presently works in those
types of cases. 48

B.

Which Transactions Should Be Treated as Section 365
Transactions?

As discussed above, the bankruptcy treatment of section 365
transactions differs significantly from the bankruptcy treatment of
a debtor's other unsecured and secured obligations. In particular,
the consequences of assumption, or "election to perform," are not
duplicated elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the
answer to the question which transactions should be treated as
section 365 transactions can have meaningful practical consequences.
Section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is limited to leases
and executory contracts. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 does not
define either the term "lease" or the phrase "executory contract."
Section 365 is similarly limited. And, the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, like the earlier Chandler Act, does not define either
the term "lease" or the phrase "executory contract." 49 The phrase
"executory contract" has been variously defined by various courts,
and there has been substantial amount of writing by judges as well
as law professors on what is an "executory contract." 50
The Review Commission recommends the elimination of the
word "executory" from section 365 and uses more than five pages
of its twenty-page discussion of section 365 to advocate this

48. REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 30, at 147.
49. According to legislative history: "Though there is no precise definition of what
contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains past
due to some extent on both sides. A note is not usually an executory contract if the only
performance that remains is repayment." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 374 (1977). See also
Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at 84.
50. QUEENAN, JR., supra note 15, § 17.03-.08.
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change. 51 Review Commission arguments for elimination of the
word "executory" include: (i) "a functional analysis of contracts is
analytically superior," 52 (ii) "persistent inconsistencies and
difficulties in identifying an executory contract for bankruptcy
purposes," 53 and (iii) "valuable contracts may be unassumable on
account of a strict executory test." 54 According to the Review
Commission, court review of the debtor's decision whether to
assume or reject would replace the executoriness test: 55 "[T]he
Proposal would streamline the (lnalysis of the debtor's contracts
and provide a directive to courts to analyze the relevant considerations guiding one's decision to perform, breach of transfer a
contract, just as a contracting party would do outside of bankruptcy. "56 Outside of bankruptcy, a contracting party might easily
decide that there are business advantages in paying outstanding
amounts owed to key suppliers. Assume, for example, that D
contracted with X for repair work and that X completed her work
prior to D's bankruptcy filing. All that remains is an account
payable by D to X. While there are other artisans, D has a
longstanding and outstanding relationship with X and wants to pay
X in full even though other holders of unsecured claims may go
unpaid. Under state law, a debtor-even an insolvent debtor--can
elect to pay some of its creditors in full and not pay other creditors
at all.

51. See Report, supra note 22, at 472-78. While most of the "executory contract"
controversy and confusion has centered on the word "executory," there can also be
disagreement as to whether there is a "contract" for purposes of section 365. Consider, for
example, the provider agreement that the Social Security Act requires that a certified health
care provider file with the Department of Health and Human Services. If the provider
agreement is a section 365 transaction, then a third party buying all of the assets of a health
care provider in Chapter 11 cannot acquire the all-important provider agreement unless it
satisfies all existing contractual obligations under the provider agreement, including any
obligation to return prebankruptcy overpayments. If, on the other hand, the provider
agreement is merely an administrative document memorializing a provider's participation in
a program imposing statutory obligations, then section 365 and its requirement of curing all
prepetition defaults will not apply. Compare In re Heffernan Mem'l Hosp., 192 B.R. 228,
231 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (executory contract) with In re Kings Terrace Nursing Home,
Docket Number ex.: No. 91Bl1478 1995 WL 65531, at *9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1995)
(statutory and regulatory requirements independent of contract).
52. Report, supra note 22, at 476.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 474.
56. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
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Under existing bankruptcy law, a Chapter 11 debtor cannot
assume or "elect to perform" such a prepetition, nonexecutory
contract unless it obtains court approval under the limited necessity
of payment exception. 57 We do not understand the Review
Commission to be recommending a large conceptual change in the
present law barring a Chapter 11 debtor from paying some but not
all prepetition contracts (i.e., debts) in full. A debtor's accounts
payable should not be section 365 transactions.
Nor should a debtor's accounts receivable be section 365
transactions. Assume, for example, that D performed repair work
for X prior to D's bankruptcy filing. All that remains to be done
is for X to pay D. Obviously, a debtor who has completely
performed its part of the contract prior to bankruptcy wants the
other party of the contract to pay. A Chapter 11 debtor should not
have to follow a process of filing a motion to assume with notice
and an opportunity for hearing in order to obtain payment from an
account debtors on a prepetition account receivable.
Because of the unique bankruptcy consequences of section 365
assumption (or "election to perform"), there needs to be a
constraint on which contracts are subject to the assumption. The
limiting language does not have to include the word "executory."
Instead, the concept should be that assumption (or election to
perform) is limited to situations in which the debtor would not
have any right to the other party's continued performance if the
debt01: ceased its performance.
C.

Who Decides What Happens to Section 365 Transactions in
Bankruptcy?

The various consequences of rejection, assumption, and
assignment can affect not only the debtor and the other party to
the lease or contract but all claimants. Accordingly, the decision
whether to reject, assume, or assign should not be made by the
debtor only. Rather, creditors should be given notice of the
debtor's election and an opportunity to object with a bankruptcy
court hearing to resolve any such objection.

57. See MARTIN BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION, 423 (1987). See
generally J. Ronald Trost & Marshall S. Huebner, The Doctrine of Necessity (materials
prepared in connection with 1997 NYU School of Law Workshop on Bankruptcy and
Reorganization).
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Section 365(d) makes the debtor's assumption or rejection of
leases or executory contracts "subject to court approval. " 58 And,
as noted above, the Review Commission makes "court review" an
integral part of its recommendations. 59 However, there is no
indication in the Bankruptcy Code as to what test a court should
employ in approving the assumption or rejection of a lease or
executory contract. The Report does not directly address what the
standard of review should be, but the Report can be read as
advocating "enhancement of the estate" 60 or "benefit to the
estate" 61 as the test.
There are cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 limiting the
trustee's rejection of contracts to those that were burdensome to
the estate. 62
Commentators contended that the connection
between the law of abandonment and the law of leases and
executory contracts mandated such a test: "The fact that the right
of rejection is a part of the right to abandon results in the obvious
conclusion that a trustee may not reject or disaffirm a contract or
lease unless the contract is burdensome to the debtor. " 63
As indicated earlier, Michael Andrew questions whether the
assumption/rejection election evolved from abandonment or vice
versa. 64 He also questions any analogy to abandonment in
determining the standard a court should apply in reviewing a
debtor's election with respect to its leases or executory contracts:
[I]f a trustee abandons valuable property, the creditors can
complain of a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to maximize
the value of the estate. But in the executory contract or lease
context, it is not the creditors who complain when the trustee
wishes to reject in favor of a more appropriate or favorable

58. Bankruptcy Code§ 365(d).
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
60. Report, supra note 22, at 475.
61. Id. at 477.
62. See e.g., In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942); In re New York
Investors Mut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). According to the Review
Commission, "under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there was no requirement of court
approval and notice to creditors for those actions." Report, supra note 22, at 474. Section
70b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 does not expressly provide for court approval. Provisions
in Chapter X, XI, XII, and XIII, however, do require court approval of rejection. See
Bankruptcy Act§§ 116(1), 313(1), 413(1), 613(1). See generally Countryman II, supra note
13, at 530-63.
63. John Creedon & Robert Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lesses, 26
Bus. LAW: 1391, 1395 (1971).
64. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.

1998]

SECTION 365

695

investment of the estate's funds. Instead, it is the nondebtor
party "to the contract or lease, who argues not that the trustee
should maximize the value of the estate, but that the trustee
should maximize the return to that party at the expense of the
estate. That argument stands abandonment doctrine on its
head. 65

Most of the reported cases under the Bankruptcy Act of
189866 and most of the reported cases under the present bankruptcy law67 have used a "business judgment" test in reviewing a
rejection or assumption decision. We agree with these cases; we
agree with Michael Andrew's comparison of section 365 decisions
to other investment decisions made by a Chapter 11 debtor. 68
Professor Shanker has argued that courts should look at the
impact of rejection on the non-debtor party in applying the
business judgment standard. 69 Relatively few reported cases under
section 365 70 have expressly acknowledged consideration of the
impact of rejection on the nondebtor party. 71 While it may seem
unfair that a Chapter 11 debtor can realize a relatively insignificant
benefit by rejecting a lease or contract that is critical to the other
party, it is no more unfair than a Chapter 11 debtor realizing a
relatively insignificant benefit by not making a payment that is
critical to a small supplier who delivered goods prepetition or to a
small contractor who did work prepetition.

65. Andrew I, supra note 11, at 897-98.
66. See e.g., In re Jackson Brewing Co., 567 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Tilco, 558
F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).
67. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984).
68. See Andrew I, supra note 11, at 895.
69. See Morris Shanker, The Treatment of Executory Contracts and Leases in the I978
Bankruptcy Code, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 15, 1979, at 11, 21. See also Jesse M. Fried, Executory
Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517, 523 (1996) ("[T]he
trustee sometimes has an incentive to reject when rejection makes the estate better off but
makes the other party worse off by a greater amount-that is, when rejection reduces total
value.").
70. Bankruptcy Code§ 1113(c)(3) uses a balancing of the equities approach to collective
bargaining agreements.
71. See Infosystems Tech., Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 71,899
(D. Mass. 1987); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1983).
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D. What Are the Obligations and Rights of the Nondebtor Party
to a Section 365 Transaction During the Course of the Case?
The "course" of a Chapter 11 case can be a year or more.
Increasingly, the decision of whether a lease or executory contract
is assumed, assigned, or rejected is deferred until the plan confirmation hearing. 72 Accordingly, there can be a large time gap
between the commencement of a bankruptcy and a final determination of the bankruptcy treatment of the debtor's leases and
executory contracts. Additionally, there is a large conceptual gap
in the present bankruptcy law as to the obligations and rights of the
nondebtor parties to executory contracts during this period.
The Report correctly observes: "Nothing in current bankruptcy
law excuses the nondebtor party to a contract or lease from its
performance obligation under the contract or lease during the gap
period. " 73 The Report could also have correctly observed that
there is nothing in current bankruptcy statutory law that compels
a nondebtor party to a contract to perform during the gap period
between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and a court hearing
on motion to assume or reject and that there is nothing in current
bankruptcy statutory law requiring the debtor to compensate the
nondebtor party for such performance. 74 There are no provisions
in the Bankruptcy Code relating to the postpetition performance
obligations and payment rights of parties to executory contracts;
although, there are a few reported cases holding that the nondebtor
party is obligated to perform postpetition. 75
With respect to leases, the automatic stay in essence requires
the nondebtor party to continue to perform postpetition. The
lessor is barred by the automatic stay from retaking the premises
or leased personal property from the. debtor. 76 Additionally,

72. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(d); cf In re Gateway Apparel, Inc., 210 B.R. 567
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (denying debtor's motion to assume and deferring decision on
assumption until confirmation hearing).
73. Report, supra note 22, at 467 (emphasis added).
74. The nondebtor can, of course, argue that she has satisfied the requirements of
section 503 for an administrative priority claim.
75. See In re Computer Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co., 715 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Feyline Presents, 81 B.R.
623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988). See generally, Douglas W. Bordewieck, The Postpetition, PreRejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1985).
76. See generally Note, Section 365 Versus Section 362: Applying the Automatic Stay to
Prevent Unilateral Contract Termination in a Bankruptcy Setting, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 935
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section 365(d) recognizes a right-in at least certain lessors-for
postpetition rental payments.
The Review Commission properly recognizes a need for the
Bankruptcy Code to address more directly the obligations and
rights of the nondebtor party to a section 365 transaction during
the course of the case.77 The estate's right to assume (or elect to
perform) would be meaningless if the other party to the lease or
contract could not be ordered to continue its performance after the
bankruptcy filing. However, the other party should be able to stop
its performance unless its right to compensation for such postpetition performance is recognized. 78
Review Commission recommendation 2.4.3 authorizes the
court to order postpetition performance and to provide "protection
of the interests of the nondebtor party" during the gap. Although
the recommendation uses the word "protection," the Report
explains that protection will take the form of a priority claim for
compensation measured by contract damages law. The following
footnote from the Report is helpful to understanding both the
Review Commission's recommendation 2.4.3 and the National
Bankruptcy Conference's recommendation paragraph f:
Although the official recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Conference is different than (sic) the Commission's, the
NBC's report contains the following discussion that is consistent
with the Commission's recommendation: "An order for
temporary performance should also be conditioned on terms
which will avoid inequity to the nondebtor. For example, it
may be unfair to expect the nondebtor to purchase costly
equipment under the contract when the trustee only intends to
continue the performance of the contract for a fraction of its
full term. If the contract provides for a lump sum payment at
the end of the term, an allocation of compensation will have to
be made to cover the stated time period on a basis that will
equate to a contract rate. These and like problems may direct
the trustee to make additional payments, or to reduce the goods

(1993).
77. An advertisement for a $22.50, 37 page pamphlet entitled, Rights Under Executory
Contracts Prior to Assumption or Rejection, states: "Executory contracts prior to assumption
or rejection is the most complex topic in Chapter 11 cases. Because of this, the topic has
been left virtually uncovered-until now." This advertisement appears on the last page of
Bankruptcy Court Decisions, Weekly News & Comment, February 3, 1998.
78. But see Neil P. Olack, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: Right to Adequate
Protection Prior to Assumption or Rejection, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 421 (1987).
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or services to be delivered by the nondebtor or vary the times
when they need to be tendered. Such protection of the
nondebtor, whatever it may be called, will be analogous to
adequate protection under section 361. If no satisfactory
arrangement can be devised to properly compensate the
nondebtor for being forced into a temporary contract, then the
court should not allow it." 79

We urge Congressional consideration of this recommendation and
explanation. 80
E. Which Section 365 Transactions Should Be Treated
Differently from Other Section 365 Transactions?
To date, Congress seems to have avoided any reconsideration
of the larger conceptual issues of section 365 by enacting special
interest legislation. When the Bankruptcy Code was amended in
1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994, section 365 was amended.
Section 365 now contains different rules for different kinds of
leases:
(i) a provision of section 365 applies only to leases of real
property in which the debtor is the lessor;81

79. Report, supra note 22, at 471 n.1139.
80. A Department of Justice Working Group made a similar recommendation to the
Review Commission. See The Report of the Department of Justice Working Group, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 19TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
AND REORGANIZATION, 752 PLI/COMM 11 (April 1997).
The Commercial Law League of America, however, opposes the proposal because:
[I]t may increase litigation surrounding section 365 by giving a significant incentive
for all non-debtor parties to file motions to obtain temporary orders, because all
non-debtor parties will want to have the ability to recover the damages specified
in Proposal 3 (i.e., 'losses reasonably and unavoidably sustained.') Further, the
CLLA is concerned that the proposal authorizing the filing of motions seeking
temporary performance could be construed to permit debtors to obtain temporary
performance orders as a way to modify provisions of their current contracts with
a non-debtor party. Further, the reference in Proposal 3 to losses reasonably and
unavoidably sustained may be interpreted too broadly to give a non-debtor party
a windfall at the expense of other creditors, by recovering losses sustained
pursuant to a contract that is burdensome to the non-debtor party. Accordingly,
for the above reasons and because current law already permits the allowance of
administrative claims for actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate, the Commercial Law League opposes the recommendation.
See Russell H. Rapoport & Alan R. Gordon, Recommendations and Comments on Section
365, 102 COM. L.J. 176, 179-80 (1997).
81. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(h).
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(ii) other provisions apply to leases of nonresidential real
property;82
(iii) still other provisions apply to leases of nonresidential
real property that are shopping center leases;83
(iv) some provisions apply to leases of residential property;84
(v) some provisions apply to leases of personal property,
other than personal property leased to an individual for
personal, family or household purposes;85 and
(vi) there are provisions that apply to a "lease of nonresidential real property under which the debtor is an affected air
carrier that is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or an aircraft
gate." 86

Section 365 also creates special rules for various kinds of contracts
such as time share plans87 and licenses of intellectual property. 88
And, still other leases and contracts are treated by other sections
of the Bankruptcy Code such as section 1110 which deals in part
with leases of aircraft, equipment, or vessels or section 1168 which
deals in part with leases of rolling stock leases and section 559 on
repurchase agreements or section 560 dealing with swap agreements
or section 1113 for collective bargaining agreements.
These special provisions for certain transactions have generated numerous practice questions such as whether a transaction
comes within one of the special provisions. Consider, for example,
the special provisions for shopping centers. Since the Bankruptcy
Code presently provides greater protection for the lessor of a
shopping center than for other lessors, debtors regularly argue that
the building or buildings in which it is leasing space is not a
shopping center. 89
Debtors also make "expresio unius" 90 arguments with respect
to transactions that do not come within a special provision. 91
Since the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that a lessor of real

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See, e.g., id. § 365(d)(3), (d)(4).
See id. § 365(b)(3), (h)(l)(C).
See id. § 365(d)(l), (d)(2).
See id. § 365(d)(lO).
Bankruptcy Code § 365(c)(4), (f)(l).
See id. § 365(h)(2).
See id. § 365(n).
Cf. 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET AL., BANKRUPTCY,§§ 5-20 (1992).
Cf In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 901 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
Cf. In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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property who rejects its lease cannot take the property back from
the lessee but has no corresponding provision for rejection by
lessors of personal property, it can be argued that a lessor of
equipment who rejects its lease in bankruptcy can take the property
back from the lessee. 92
The Review Commission acknowledges that enactment of its
recommendations without elimination of these various special
provisions "may create new difficulties both for the special cases
and for the general cases. " 93 The Review Commission does not
otherwise address the question of which, if any, section 365
transactions should be treated differently from other section 365
transactions. 94 If Congress decides to address the larger conceptual interests inherent in section 365, it should address this question.
V.

Conclusion

Congress has not reviewed "the larger conceptual issues
inherent in" bankruptcy treatment of leases and executory contracts
since the 1930s. We respectfully submit that the Review Commission did not undertake such a review. 95
A review of the "larger conceptual issues inherent in section
365" was not a part of the Review Commission's mandate. The

92. Professor Kenneth Klee has made a different argument for treating rejection of real
estate leases different from rejection of personal property leases: "I think that there was
extensive testimony during the hearings. I particularly remember testimony by Peter Coogan
about the lessee's interest in real property being unique from personalty because he had
privity of estate as well as privity of contract." Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at
65.
93. Report, supra note 22, at 476; see also id. at 463 ("this Proposal might be criticized
as being inadequately remedial since it stops short of dismantling the special interest
provisions presently in section 365").
94. The National Bankruptcy Conference recommends the elimination of the special
provisions relating to shopping centers, aircraft, vessel, and rolling stock leases as "not in the
interest of reorganization" and "affecting the debtor's ability to reorganize." NBC, at 143-44
(1997). Any Bankruptcy Code provision that affords protection to the nondebtor party to
leases is "not in the interest of reorganization" and is "affecting the debtor's ability to
reorganize." We respectfully suggest that any congressional comparison include not only the
needs of the debtor and the nondebtor party in this type of transaction but also the needs
of the debtor and nondebtor party in this type of transaction as contrasted with the needs
of the debtor and nondebtor party in other section 365 transactions.
95. Cf John D. Ayer, Not Dead on the Gurney, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER (WEST),
Oct. 1997, at 1, 3 ("In defense of themselves, there is plenty that the commissioners can say.
They didn't have the staff, the support or the hospitable environment of the 1973
commission. And indeed, they never had a mandate for comprehensive reform.").
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Congressional Record section-by-section description of the 1994
legislation establishing the Review Commission states:
[T]he Commission should be aware that Congress is generally
satisfied with the basic framework established in the current
Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the work of the Commission
should be based upon reviewing, improving, and updating the
Code in ways which do not disturb the fundamental tenets of
and balance of current law. 96

The "larger conceptual issues inherent in section 365" that the
Review Commission did not review are, in essence, questions of
"balance." As Judge Robert Jones observed, "[t]he purpose behind
section 365 is to balance the state law contract right of the creditor
to receive the benefit of his bargain with the federal law equitable
right of the debtor to have an opportunity to reorganize." 97 We
believe that, with few exceptions, the bankruptcy courts have
properly balanced these competing "rights" or policies.
The Review Commission was well-served by the advice of
Gerald K. Smith, prominent Phoenix bankruptcy lawyer and
Deputy Director of the Commission, on Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States in 1972-73, on leases and executory contracts:
"Major policy issues were resolved long ago as to the mechanics of
assumption and rejection. Section 365 of the Code and the cases
dealing therewith are generally satisfactory."98
In tum, Congress was well-served by work of the Review
Commission on leases and executory contracts and by the work of
the National Bankruptcy Conference. Bankruptcy legislation99
that adopts the section 365 recommendations of the Review
Commission as restated in the revised draft of section 365 prepared
by the National Bankruptcy Conference would be "improving and
updating the Code in ways which do not disturb the fundamental
tenets of and balance of current law."
96. 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,752-01 (daily ed. October 4, 1994) (emphasis added).
97. Coleman Oil Co. v. Circle K Corp., 190 B.R. 370, 376 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996), affd,
127 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1997).
98. Gerald K. Smith, Executory Contracts, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1995-96 721, 722 (1996). This article was one of a series, solicited by Judge Norton
from members of the American College of Bankruptcy, as advice to the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission on needed changes in the bankruptcy law. See Norton Annual Survey
of Bankruptcy Law 1995-96, supra, at ix.
99. Cf Ayer, supra note 97, at 3. "Grant Gilmore pointed out years ago that
bankruptcy reform comes in 40-year cycles (1898, 1938, 1978). On this schedule, we aren't
due for legislation until 2018." Id.

